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Abstract 
Using structural equation modelling, this paper examines the hypothesis that 
employees can learn about democracy through employee participation in workplace 
decision-making, thus resulting in more positive attitudes toward democracy in the 
wider political arena. The research finds that workplace democracy is strongly 
positively associated with increased interest in politics and wider pro-democracy 
affect. This result holds water even when controlling for reverse causality and the 
confounding influence of trade union membership. The paper suggests that work can 
have an important effect on wider governance at the level of the community and the 
state. 
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Introduction 
 There is a huge literature on the nature of the relationship between 
organisations and wider democratic politics, but the empirical evidence is so cloudy 
and inconsistent that nothing can be concluded definitively in relation to causation. In 
spite of all the research, it is still not clear how, to what extent and in what direction 
the two constructs impact one another. There are two ways of looking at this 
relationship from the viewpoint of directionality, or causality. One is to ask how 
democratic politics impact organisations and the other is to ask how organisations 
impact democratic politics. 
 Some researchers have argued that democracy has a positive, albeit sometimes 
indirect (Helliwell, 1994), effect on organisations and organisational decision-making. 
For example, a wealth of evidence suggests that democracy has a positive effect on 
foreign direct investment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Guerin and Manzocchi, 2009; 
Jensen, 2003). The argument is often made that democracies provide organisations 
with a more stable context for growth (Dam, 2007; Quinn and Woolley, 2001). But 
others have made equally convincing arguments that non-democratic states received 
as much foreign direct investment as democratic states (Resnick, 2001; Yang, 2007). 
There is, as yet, no definitive evidence that democratic political systems are good for 
organisations, although the rhetoric at least seems to fall on this side of this argument. 
 The opposite question, i.e., whether, and to what extent, organisations can 
impact democratic politics, has also not been answered definitively in the literature, 
perhaps in part because it requires a unique marriage of human resource management 
and political science (Timming, 2015). It has been argued that organisations, 
particularly multinational corporations, can and do undermine democracies (Barley, 
2007; Sklair, 2002), particularly in the developing world. But much less is known 
about the extent to which organisations can also serve as vehicles by which to 
strengthen wider democratic attitudes and to promote democratic decision-making at 
the level of community or national governance. Although recent work has looked at 
the effect of organisational democracy on political behaviours (Budd et al, 2017), the 
question of how employee voice initiatives impact on democratic attitudes is ripe for 
analysis, hence the present study. 
 Needless to say, this paper does not pretend to settle the debate on the inter-
relationship between organisations and democratic attitudes, but it does offer another 
important piece to an unsolved puzzle. It focuses specifically on the question of 
whether participation in decision-making at work can promote wider ‘pro-democracy 
affect’, defined as one’s personal views or attitudes toward the usefulness of 
democratic decision-making in governance. The hypothesised ‘mechanism’ is that 
employees can learn about democracy at work, which in turn has positive upward 
democratic ‘spillover’ to society (Pateman 1970; Karasek 1976; Elden 1981). It will 
be argued that managerial practices centring on workplace democracy make 
employees more interested in wider democratic politics, thus resulting in what we call 
increased pro-democracy affect. In this way, societies can potentially enrich 
citizenship and commitment to democratic governance by promoting employee 
participation in organisational decision-making. 
 The next section reviews the previous work on the effects of employee voice 
and the determinants of democracy, and articulates the paper’s hypotheses. After that, 
the research methods are described in detail. The results of the research are then 
reported, followed by a discussion of the paper’s main contribution to the literature. 
Previous Work and Hypotheses 
The link between workplace democracy and pro-democracy affect 
 In the light of a heavy focus in the HRM literature on the multi-faceted 
‘inward’ effects of participation in decision-making (PDM) on organisations and 
employees, this field is dominated by an organisationally-focused gaze, which rarely 
looks at the potential wider societal or political effects. Various effects of PDM at the 
level of the organisation have been robustly noted, such as in relation to employee 
commitment, trust relations, employee turnover and well-being (Boxall et al, 2011; 
Dundon et al, 2004; Timming, 2012), as well as on improved productivity and 
performance (Peccei & Rosenthal, 2001), lower levels of industrial action (Guest and 
Hoque, 1994) and lower absenteeism (Zhu et al, 2006). Yet, whilst PDM has these 
obvious and well-studied ‘inward’ effects on organisations and employees, its 
‘outward’ or ‘upward’ effects on societies and the communities in which we live have 
been rarely investigated, despite Adam Smith (1776) warning about the deleterious 
effects of stupefying labour on workers’ public sphere engagement. Among the few 
arguments that have considered the externalities of workplace participation in terms 
of wider citizenship behaviour include Foley and Polanyi (2006) and, with a focus on 
employee rights, Budd and Zagelmeyer (2010) and Wilkinson et al (2014). However, 
there is still, according to Foley and Polanyi (2006: 176), ‘little empirical support’ for 
these mostly theoretical arguments of the upward spillover of workplace democracy. 
The present study fills this empirical gap through a statistical examination of the 
effects of PDM on employees’ wider interest in democratic politics, or, as we call it, 
‘pro-democracy affect’. We turn now to an examination of this phenomenon. 
 Within the wider determinants of democratic attitudes literature, the 
association between belonging to a form of civic association (where democratic 
decisions are made) and members’ wider interest in political decision-making was 
first publicised by de Tocqueville (2004). This theme was later resurrected by 
Pateman (1970), who described how opportunities to participate at work (and 
conversely, where there was a lack of opportunity) build (or undermine) one’s wider 
political participatory skills. Her research can be situated alongside Almond and 
Verba (1965: 366), who claimed that ‘political orientations’ depend on opportunities 
to participate in non-political arenas, and of ‘crucial significance here are the 
opportunities to participate in decisions at one’s place of work’.  
 Karasek (1976) continued the exploration of the impact of (what he termed) 
‘active jobs’ on political participation, concluding that ‘the worker who lacks 
discretion over the content of his daily work experience is likely to be “passive” in 
leisure and political participation’ (1976:1). Later, Karasek (2004) confirmed his 
initial findings linking workers’ control over demanding work to their political and 
leisure activity. Contributing to the debate, Gardell (1976) and Gustavsen (1980) drew 
on Marx’s concept of alienation to suggest that lack of control at work limits workers’ 
human creativity, and that this alienation from the self has an adverse effect on non-
work participation in political activities. While Greenberg (1981) later disputed the 
generalisability of Pateman’s theory, Elden (1981: 43) provided empirical support for 
the thesis, concluding that work democratisation ‘correlates significantly with a sense 
of political efficacy’, and Near et al (1980: 416) also asserted that ‘work is highly 
important in society and pervades other aspects of social life’.  
 Putnam (1993, 2000) later extended this field of study by arguing that the 
norms and trust created in one participatory context can ‘spill over’ into, and create, 
greater interest in engagement in the macro-political arena. Conversely, lack of 
participative opportunities in civil society will result in poor political self-confidence 
and a lack of interest in wider democratic participation. A related theme is carried 
through Karasek and Theorell (1990), who emphasised the contribution of 
physiological aspects of stimulating jobs on active societal participation. In 
highlighting the negative affect of lack of job autonomy and participation on health, 
the authors were paralleling Marmot et al.’s (1984, 1997) Whitehall Studies - which 
identified psychophysiological connections between level of work-related decision 
latitude and stress-related illness.  
 Gaining an interest in wider political action through employee PDM (Pateman, 
1970) is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for what we call pro-democracy 
affect. Pro-democracy affect, we argue, goes beyond a mere interest in politics and 
demonstrates a ready willingness to engage actively in pro-democratic activities such 
as voting and campaigning (Barro, 1999; Hegre et al, 2012; Budd et al, 2017). Such 
political engagement depends ultimately on the establishment of a deep-seated trust in 
political institutions (Mishler and Rose, 1997). Thus, the empirical question at the 
very heart of this supposed relationship is: to what extent can employee PDM spill 
over not only into a wider interest in democracy, but also into trust itself in the 
political institution of democracy? These questions lend themselves to our first, 
second and third hypotheses: 
H1: PDM is positively associated with interest in politics. 
H2: PDM is positively associated with wider pro-democracy affect. 
H3: Interest in politics positively mediates the relationship between PDM and 
pro-democracy affect. 
 
These hypotheses suggest, in short, a potential ‘learning effect’ whereby employees 
who are allowed to participate in decision-making at work can then carry an 
appreciation of the principles of democracy beyond the workplace and into the wider 
political and civil society. 
What about reverse causality and other confounding variables? 
 In the light of Wright’s (1921) now classic study, it is commonplace in 
scientific and statistical research to note that correlation does not imply causality, and 
this is especially relevant for the present study. Although we are arguing that 
employee PDM can result in democratic spillover into the wider society, we also 
recognise that there are other factors that can influence one’s interest in politics and 
pro-democracy affect. Fortunately, the dataset we use allows us to control for these 
alternative explanations. Two potential confounds are discussed in this section: (i) the 
possibility that those with already strong pro-democracy affect may ‘self-select’ into 
workplaces that allow for PDM and (ii) the effect of trade union membership on not 
only PDM, but also on wider interest in politics. 
Controlling for self-selection and reverse causality 
A pre-existing interest in politics may contribute to individuals self-selecting 
into employment that permits greater participation. For instance, research in the field 
of person-organisation fit suggests that job seekers often compare their needs and 
values with the characteristics of the firm (Judge and Bretz, 1992; Kausel and 
Slaughter, 2011). This is supported in research by Hallier and Summers (2011), where 
an interest in politics among graduating students was found to be associated with 
intention to seek community advocacy employment. Research on preferences (Hakim, 
2002) has similar indications for personal preferences and job choice. The evidence 
from worker-owned organisations indicates that, while motivations to work in a 
workers’ cooperative are varied, including the desire for job security (Bradley and 
Gelb, 1980), self-accomplishment (Ng and Ng, 2009) and feelings of belonging 
(Jones et al, 2009), a sense of personal autonomy and political ideals remain 
significant motivators (Carter, 2003). To take account of the possibility of reverse 
causality, we introduce our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: PDM is still positively associated with both interest in politics and pro-
democracy affect even when controlling for reverse causality. 
 
By incorporating an item into our model that measures the extent to which the 
respondent believes it is important to for one to choose a job that enables one to use 
his or her own initiative, we can exert some statistical control the possibility of self-
selection and reverse causality. 
Controlling for the confounding effect of trade union membership 
 
 Finally, we turn to the potentially confounding impact of unions. Of particular 
significance in this respect is the association between union presence in a workplace 
and correspondingly greater levels political activism among union members. For 
instance, union membership is associated with increased democratic participation 
(Lipset, 1983), and Lamare (2010) also found that contact with a union increased 
voter turnout. Bryson et al (2014) propose that this union influence operates both 
through peer pressure within union member networks, and by increasing employees’ 
‘attachment to democratic engagement in society at large’ (p. 1). This research is 
supported by Gray and Caul (2000), who concluded that lower union density means 
workers were ‘uninterested, uninformed, and politically inactive’ (p. 1092). In the 
same vein, it is also of note that the decline in union density in European nations since 
the 1970s has been mirrored by a decline in voter turnout (Radcliff, 2001) and an 
increase in employee silence (Milliken et al, 2003; van Dyne et al, 2003; Timming 
and Johnstone, 2015). Deriving from this body of literature are three further 
hypotheses: 
H5a: Union membership is associated with greater PDM. 
H5b: Union membership is associated with greater interest in politics.  
H5c: Union membership is associated with greater pro-democracy affect. 
In summary, our study is taking forward the existing, but small, literature that 
considers the wider democratic impact of workplace democracy by providing new and 
relevant empirical evidence. In particular, we are making a new contribution to the 
HRM field through our consideration of the wider societal and political effects of 
employee PDM, with a particular emphasis on how employee voice initiatives impact 
on attitudes toward democracy. Figure 1 illustrates the hypotheses outlined above. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Research Methods 
Sample 
 The 2010 European Social Survey, Round Five (hereafter ESS51), was used to 
evaluate the integrity of our hypotheses. Funded primarily from the European 
Commission and the European Science Foundation, with additional financial support 
coming from the national research councils involved in the project, ESS5 is among 
the largest social and behavioural attitudes datasets ever compiled (N=52,458). The 
respondents are drawn from 27 European countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, UK, 
Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Ukraine. The survey 
instrument measured over 650 variables on basic demographics and social and 
behavioural attitudes. Several of the items asked specifically about respondents’ 
employment situation and attitudes toward democracy. 
 Whilst ESS5 is often used in cross-national studies (Jowell et al, 2007), it can 
also serve as a singular dataset with results generalisable to Europe. The sampling 
universe is thus all persons aged 15 and over living in private households in the 27 
                                                          
1 Data can be accessed at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=5 
European countries from which the data were drawn. According to the European 
Social Survey (2009: 13), this sample ‘was selected by strict random probability 
sampling at every stage and the respondents [were] interviewed face-to-face’. The 
ESS5 research team went to great lengths to minimise non-response bias (Stoop et al, 
2010), resulting in an overall response rate of 60.8 percent. A rigorous translation 
strategy (European Social Survey, 2010a) was also used in order to ensure linguistic 
consistency across the survey instruments. In terms of the demographics of the 
sample, 54.6 percent are female, 46.0 percent were in paid work at the time and the 
average respondent age was 48.51 years (s.d.=18.79). 
 The considerable size of the sample (N=52,458) is notable. Like any other 
inference-based statistical method, structural equation modelling is sensitive to 
sample size. To put this study into perspective, Kline (2005: 15) defines as ‘large’ any 
structural model with more than 200 cases. Because of the enormous scale of the 
sample, it should be noted that there is an increased risk of Type I error. Though this 
possibility should be kept in the back of one’s mind, it would be folly to describe the 
large sample size as a limitation of the study. If anything, it is one of its key strengths. 
Measures 
 Table 1 reports the variables, both observed and unobserved, used in the 
model. As reported in the table, as well as in Figure 1, the structural model consists of 
three unobserved, or latent, variables (Participation in Decision-Making, Interest in 
Politics and Pro-Democracy Affect) and two observed, or indicator, variables (Trade 
Union and Initiative). How each variable was measured in ESS5 is described briefly 
in this section. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Participation in Decision-Making. This is the primary exogenous 
(independent) variable. It is composed of four indicator variables. Respondents were 
asked, on a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 implies ‘no influence’ and 10 implies ‘complete 
control’) to indicate how much management allows them (i) to decide how their daily 
work is organised, (ii) to influence policy decisions about the activities of the 
organisation and (iii) to choose or change the pace at which they work. Respondents 
were also asked to assess how true, on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 implies ‘not at all 
true’, 2 implies ‘a little true’, 3 implies ‘quite true’ and 4 implies ‘very true’), the 
following statement is: (iv) ‘I can decide the time I start and finish work’. Taken 
together, each of these indicators taps an underlying dimension of the multi-faceted 
construct of employee participation in decision-making (Cotton et al, 1988), reflecting 
an organisational culture of workplace democracy. 
 Interest in Politics. This latent variable serves as a mediator. It is composed of 
four indicator variables. Respondents were asked, on a scale of 0 to 7 (where 0 
implies ‘no time at all’ and 7 implies ‘more than three hours’), to indicate how much 
time they spent (i) watching news or programmes about politics or current events on 
television, (ii) listening to news or programmes about politics or current affairs on the 
radio and (iii) reading about politics and current affairs in the newspapers. 
Respondents were also asked, on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 implies ‘not at all 
interested’, 2 implies ‘hardly interested’, 3 implies ‘quite interested’ and 4 implies 
‘very interested’), to indicate (iv) how interested they are in politics. It should be 
noted that the latter indicator was recoded in order to invert the response categories, 
thus making the interpretation of the results more intuitive. Taken together, these 
items tap respondents’ underlying interest in politics (Prior, 2010). 
 Pro-Democracy Affect. This is the primary endogenous (dependent) variable. 
It is composed of five indicator variables. Respondents were asked, on a scale of 0 to 
10 (where 0 implies ‘no trust at all’ and 10 implies ‘complete trust’), how much they 
personally trust their country’s (i) parliament, (ii) politicians and (iii) political parties. 
Respondents were also asked, on a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 implies ‘extremely 
dissatisfied’ and 10 implies ‘extremely satisfied), (iv) how satisfied they were with 
the way democracy works in their country. Finally, respondents were asked to rate on 
a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 implies ‘disagree strongly’ and 5 implies ‘agree strongly’) 
how much they agreed that (v) political parties that want to ‘overthrow democracy’ 
should be banned. The response categories of the latter variable, it should be noted, 
were recoded and inverted from their original form in order to make the interpretation 
of the results more intuitive. Taken together, these indicators reflect the criteria that 
other researchers have used to measure generalised support for democracy (Dalton, 
1999; Canache, 2001; Inglehart, 2003). 
 Trade Union Membership. This exogenous variable was included in the model 
as a simple dummy, where a code of 0 implies that the respondent is not currently a 
member of a trade union and 1 implies that the respondent is or has been a member of 
a trade union. This was the only variable in the model that underwent a substantive 
recode from its original form. ESS5 asked respondents if they are, or have ever been, 
a member of a trade union or staff association. The original response categories 
(1=‘yes, currently’, 2=‘yes, previously’ and 3=‘no’) were recoded in a manner such 
that categories 2 and 1 were combined in order to indicate that the respondent is or 
has been a member of a trade union. The rationale underlying this recode is twofold. 
First, by combining former and current trade union members into one category, we 
are still able to test for the effect of union membership, even if it is previous 
membership. Second, like multiple regression analysis, structural equation modelling 
does not technically allow for the incorporation into the model of multi-categorical 
nominal variables, thus rendering the original variable unusable. 
 Initiative. This variable was introduced into the model as a covariate in order 
to control for the possibility of reverse causality, as discussed above. It is a single 
indicator that asks respondents, on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 implies ‘not important at 
all’, 2 implies ‘not important’, 3 implies ‘neither important, nor unimportant’, 4 
implies ‘important’ and 5 implies ‘very important’), how important it is for them to 
choose a job that enabled them to use their own initiative. By including this variable, 
the model is able to hedge against the possibility that individuals who already like to 
participate in decision-making are self-selecting into employment that allows them to 
participate in decision-making, and not the other way around, as is hypothesised in 
this paper. 
Analysis 
 In the light of the presence of unobserved latent variables in the model, 
structural equation modelling was used in order to test the paper’s hypotheses. 
Although structural equation modelling, also referred to as analysis of covariance 
structures, is historically thought of as the method of choice for establishing causality 
(Shook et al, 2004: 398), such thinking is misguided. True causation can only be 
established via a longitudinal and experimental research design that takes account of 
time lags (Gollob and Reichardt, 1987, 1991; MacCallum and Austin, 2000). Cross-
sectional structural equation models, like the present study, can at best ‘offer the 
potential for tentative causal inferences to be drawn’ (Bullock et al, 1994: 253). In 
other words, given the constraints of the ESS5 study design, the present study gets 
fairly close to the ‘black box’ of causality. 
 The present study assumes that people can learn about democracy at work, 
with positive spillover at the level of the society. The obvious weakness to this 
argument is the possibility of reversal causality, discussed above. That is, what if 
people who already feel positively about democracy actively search for jobs that 
allow them to participate in decision-making? Most researchers would control for this 
possibility by using instrumental variables in a non-recursive structural equation 
model design (Wong and Law, 1999), in indeed this was the approach of Budd et al 
(2017). But the use of instrumental variables in structural equation modelling 
decreases model parsimony, so they should be avoided if a more parsimonious 
alternative is available in the dataset. Fortunately, as described above, ESS5 contains 
an ideal control variable, Initiative (see Table 1). By including Initiative in the model, 
we can examine the effect of employee participation in decision-making on broader 
attitudes toward democracy, even whilst taking into account that some employees 
may have chosen jobs that allow them to participate in decision-making. In 
accordance with the principle of parsimony (Bollen, 1989), the model is thus linear 
recursive. 
 This model is what Joreskog (1993) calls ‘strictly confirmatory’. In other 
words, in the event of poor fit, we will not use modification indices to re-specify the 
model to achieve a good fit. The main reason for this simple ‘thumbs up or thumbs 
down’ approach is that modification indices tend to be inflated in larger samples, so 
any post-hoc tinkering with the model would end up ‘[over]fitting small idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the sample’ (MacCallum et al, 1992: 501). Missing data, which is 
considerably below the conventional cut-off of 10 percent of total cases (Byrne, 2001: 
288), was handled using standard full information maximum likelihood. After 
applying the necessary parameter constraints (see Figure 1), the model is over-
identified with 85 degrees of freedom (based on 135 distinct sample moments and 50 
that require estimation). The model is thus scientifically useful and able to be rejected. 
The graphical interface of AMOS 19.0 was used to design and execute the structural 
model. 
Results 
 Table 2 reports the results of the structural equation model. Both standardised 
and unstandardised estimates (hereafter ‘weights’) are provided, along with standard 
errors and critical ratio values. For the benefit of non-structural equation modelling 
specialists, critical ratios are p-values expressed in standardised z-scores, so a 
conventional p-value of less than 0.05 is equivalent to a critical ratio value of greater 
than 1.96 or less than -1.96. The model fit statistics are reported at the base of the 
table. Looking at the big picture, the hypothesised model fits the data well. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 The overall level of fit between the hypothesised model and sample data is, by 
conventional standards (Hu and Bentler, 1999), very high. Using maximum likelihood 
estimation, the chi-square statistic is 7,986.42 (DF=85, p=0.000). The likelihood ratio 
method is extremely sensitive with very large sample sizes (MacCallum et al, 1996: 
132). Therefore, a number of alternative goodness-of-fit indices are reported here: 
CFI = .968, TLI = .955, NFI = .968, RMSEA = .042, PRATIO = .708, PNFI = .686, 
PCFI = .686, Hoelter .01 = 777. Unlike with most other statistical methods, there are 
no universally agreed upon goodness-of-fit indices for structural equation modelling. 
But according to Byrne (2001: 79-88), the indices reported in this model are 
indicative, generally speaking, of a very good fit between the model and the data. 
 The results of the structural equation model firmly support H1. It was found 
that employee participation in organisational decision-making was positively 
associated with interest in politics (weight = .332, C.R. = 30.49) Alternatively stated, 
the more employees are able to participate in workplace decision-making, the more 
interested they are in politics. 
 Also strongly supported by the structural equation model is H2. It was found 
that employee participation in decision-making is positively associated with what we 
have termed pro-democracy affect (weight = .464, C.R. = 18.92). This result indicates 
that employees who participate in decision-making are more likely to harbour positive 
feelings toward wider political democracy in general. 
 The results of the research equally corroborate H3. It would appear that 
interest in politics mediates the relationship between employee participation in 
decision-making and pro-democracy affect inasmuch as interest in politics and pro-
democracy affect are positively associated (weight = .759, C.R. = 37.56). In laymen’s 
terms, this finding suggests that employee participation in decision-making is directly 
related to pro-democracy affect, but it is also indirectly related through the mediating 
influence of interest in politics. 
 H4, which is crucial to the underlying argument, is also supported by the 
model. Recall that H4 posits that the above relationships will still hold water when 
controlling for the possibility of reverse causality. It was found that initiative was 
positively associated with employee participation in decision-making (weight = .145, 
C.R. = 44.35). This result implies that the more important it is for one to have a job 
that allows one to use his or her own initiative, the more likely one is to be able to 
participate in decision-making. Alternatively stated, it appears that people who 
already value the ability to participate in decision-making are seeking out jobs that 
allow them to participate in decision-making. However, even controlling for this 
effect, the relationship between participation in decision-making and pro-democracy 
affect still holds water, as established above. That is to say that there appears to be 
‘positive upward democratic spillover’ in spite of the fact that some employees may 
be actively seeking employment that allows them to participate in decision-making in 
the first place. 
 Finally, the model confirms H5a, H5b and H5c. Union membership was 
positively associated with employee participation in decision-making (weight = .122, 
C.R. = 18.74), interest in politics (weight = .182, C.R. = 16.31) and pro-democracy 
affect (weight = .633, C.R. = 23.40), as should be expected in light of the literature 
reviewed above. In other words, union members enjoy a greater level of participation 
in organisational decision-making, are more interested in politics and harbour more 
positive attitudes toward the principles of democracy in general. But in spite of these 
significant relationships, the crucial link between PDM and pro-democracy affect still 
holds water. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study addresses the democratic spillover effect by providing rigorous 
evidence that PDM does indeed exert a positive influence on the extent to which 
employees experience pro-democratic affect, including increased trust in political 
institutions and increased commitment to democracy. The path between workplace 
democracy and wider pro-democracy affect is clear even when controlling for reverse 
causality and confounding variables. PDM thus contributes to a readiness to engage 
with democratic governance at the societal level. The purpose of this section is to 
examine these results and implications of the study more closely. 
 The paper makes a strong and unique contribution to the ongoing debate about 
employee participation. It is widely recognized that participation is a complex concept 
and, in conjunction, hypotheses 1 and 2 appear to underpin the broader idea of what 
might be called democratic spillover (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pateman 1970). On 
the one hand, the indicator variables used to measure PDM in the model represent 
task-based participation - the type of participation commonly used by HR 
management (Beardwell and Claydon, 2007), and this is coupled with more strategic 
decision-making involvement. Through capturing the multiple components of 
participation at work, our findings provide compelling evidence that employee 
participation engenders pro-democracy affect even when considering mediating 
factors such as interest in politics (hypothesis 3) and prior inclination towards 
participative attitudes and beliefs (hypothesis 4). All of the results on the effects of 
PDM were consistent with expectations. 
 The findings also make important contributions to the HRM and determinants 
of democracy literatures, demonstrating how employees carry effects of HRM beyond 
and outwith the workplace. This is not to suggest that participation at work is 
exclusively about interest in politics or pro-democratic affect, however, these two 
constructs do represent significant and positive out-of-work outcomes for HR 
practices in the workplace. In fact, there is significant literature indicating that HR-led 
involvement and participation practices, such as the high performance work system, 
have other non-work effects, including negative spillovers in terms of job-to-home 
stress (Godard, 2004) and positive spillover in terms of work/life balance (Heywood 
et al, 2005).  While our findings echo claims that PDM at work is generally a ‘good’ 
thing (Carter, 2006), with positive effects in the workplace, what is more noval is the 
finding that PDM is related to wider societal and political effects of HRM practices. 
Such wider spillover has received scarce scholarly attention, with the HRM literature 
overwhelmingly focussed on ‘downward’ or ‘inward’ worker behaviour within 
organisations, and on benefits for organisations themselves. 
 Our findings are important inasmuch as they confirm a set of hypotheses about 
the link between workplace participation and wider societal and democratic affects, 
and interestingly corroborate the results of Almond and Verba (1963), Pateman 
(1970) and Karasek (1976) that participation at work influences attitudes towards 
political participation and towards politics (structures and processes). It extends this 
previous work on participation spillover to indicate that PDM at work influences both 
interest in politics, attitude towards the values of wider democracy and trust in 
political institutions. In addition, our findings extend previous work to include 
participation practices in the workplace, both determined at task level and at strategic 
level. It is worthy to note that the employment relationship and its social, economic 
and political context has changed in the intervening decades, to one where trade union 
density and reach has declined (and mirroring this we have seen the rise of individual-
centred human resource management), the service and knowledge sectors have 
grown, the political institutions of the EU have developed, and voter turnout has 
generally declined. This is significant since our results suggest that PDM centred on 
individualised participation in decision-making results in pro-democratic affect.  
 In adding to what is known about the extent to which organisations and their 
practices serve as vehicles by which to strengthen wider democratic attitudes, the 
results speak to concerns about voter turnout across Europe (Blais and Rubenson, 
2013), particularly poor turnout at local government elections. Increased PDM at 
work may, judging by our results, increase political participation and trust in political 
institutions, addressing the decline in voter turnout. While the link between union 
membership and voting activity is demonstrated by Lamare (2010), the link we have 
established between individualised employee participation and wider democratic 
outcomes is important due to the ongoing lack of reach of unions in large parts of the 
private sector (Purcell, 2012), especially for women and younger workers (Bryson 
and Forth, 2010; Vandaela, 2012). These findings thus speak to concerns about low 
youth participation in politics in Europe (Ayres, 2014), the most obvious implication 
being that organisations, and perhaps employment law, should continue to promote 
employee participation since the effects are demonstrably positive for a healthy 
democracy. This is especially pertinent for younger workers who are traditionally 
unreceptive to political engagement. 
 One last implication that deserves brief mention is that the results we have 
uncovered in this paper appear to be robust cross-nationally, at least within Europe, 
but we still do not know whether they hold water outwith the EU. This is a serious 
limitation that calls for further research. In particular, it would be interesting to see if 
the use of Western HRM practices, most of which entail employee voice and worker 
participation schemes, poses any threat to non-Western, authoritarian governments 
that have no history of democratic participation. The spread of Western HR practices 
can thus be viewed by authoritarian regimes as a potential ‘Trojan Horse’ capable of 
effecting unwelcome political change. Research on this question would make a 
fascinating addition to a growing body of literature on the relationship between 
workplace democracy and wider pro-democracy affect. 
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Table 1. Variables and indicators 
 
Unobserved variables 
 
Participation in Decision-Making (PDM) 
Please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you … 
 ‘to decide how your own daily work is/was organised’ 
  (0=I have/had no influence, 10=I have/had complete control) 
 ‘to influence policy decisions about the activities of the organisation’ 
  (0=I have/had no influence, 10=I have/had complete control) 
 ‘to choose or change your pace of work’ 
  (0=I have/had no influence, 10=I have/had complete control) 
Please tell me how true each of the following statements is about your job … 
 ‘I can decide the time I start and finish work’ 
  (1=Not at all true, 4=Very true) 
 
Interest in Politics (InterestPolitics) 
On an average weekday, how much of your time working television is spent watching news 
or programmes about politics or current affairs? 
  (0=No time at all, 7=More than three hours) 
On an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio is spent listening to 
news or programmes about politics or current affairs? 
  (0=No time at all, 7=More than three hours) 
On an average weekday, how much of time to you spend reading about politics and current 
affairs in the newspapers? 
  (0=No time at all, 7=More than three hours) 
How interested would you say your are in politics? 
  (1=Not at all interested, 4=Very interested) 
 
Pro-Democracy Affect (ProDemAffect) 
Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust … 
 ‘[country’s] parliament?’ 
  (0=No trust at all, 10=Complete trust) 
 ‘politicians?’ 
  (0=No trust at all, 10=Complete trust) 
 ‘political parties?’ 
  (0=No trust at all, 10=Complete trust) 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? 
  (0=Extremely dissatisfied, 10=Extremely satisfied) 
Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement … 
 ‘Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned’ 
  (1=Disagree strongly, 5=Agree strongly) 
 
Observed variables 
 
Trade Union (Union) 
Are you a member of a trade union or similar organisation? 
  (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 
 
Initiative 
For you personally, how important do you think each of the following would be if you were 
choosing a job? 
 ‘A job that enabled you to use your own initiative’ 
  (1=Not important at all, 5=Very important) 
 
Source: European Social Survey (2010b) 
  
Table 2. Results 
 
Variables    Unstandardised (Standardised) Weights 
 Standard Error   Critical Ratio 
 
Structural Model 
 
PDM  InterestPolitics  .332 (.225)     
 .011    30.49* 
PDM  ProDemAffect  .464 (.101)     
 .025    18.92* 
 
InterestPolitics  ProDemAffect .759 (.245)     
 .020    37.56* 
 
Initiative  PDM   .145 (.295)     
 .003    44.35* 
 
Union  PDM   .122 (.092)     
 .007    18.74* 
Union  InterestPolitics  .182 (.093)     
 .011    16.31* 
Union  ProDemAffect  .633 (.105)     
 .027    23.40* 
 
Measurement Model 
 
PDM  Decide   6.90 (.902)     
 .103    66.89* 
PDM  Influence   5.61 (.737)     
 .086    65.18* 
PDM  Change   6.47 (.843)     
 .097    66.57* 
PDM  Start    Fixed at 1.00**     N/A
    N/A 
 
InterestPolitics  TVpol  Fixed at 1.00**     N/A
    N/A 
InterestPolitics  RDpol  .937 (.443)     
 .017    56.15* 
InterestPolitics  NPpol  .720 (.580)     
 .011    64.44* 
InterestPolitics  Interest  .786 (.608)     
 .012    67.17* 
 
ProDemAffect  Banparty  -.003 (-.006)     
 .002    -1.28 
ProDemAffect  SatDem  .685 (.586)     
 .005    149.77* 
ProDemAffect  TrustPart  Fixed at 1.00**     N/A
    N/A 
ProDemAffect  TrustPol  1.04 (.952)     
 .003    367.14* 
ProDemAffect  TrustParl  .958 (.927)     
 .004    258.08* 
 
Model Fit: CFI = .968, TLI = .955, NFI = .968, RMSEA = .042, PRATIO = .708, PNFI = .686, PCFI = 
.686, Hoelter .01 = 777 
* Equivalent to a significant p-value of less than 0.05 
** For the benefit of the non-structural equation modelling specialist, it is a requirement of 
this method to fix some parameters at 1.00 for technical reasons. For each latent variable, a 
random number table was used to decide which indicator would have its parameter fixed. 
  
Figure 1. Path diagram and hypotheses 
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